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Abstract
Empathic responses, such as sympathy towards others, are a key ingredient in the decision to provide help to those
in need. The determinants of empathic responses are usually thought to be the vividness, similarity, and proximity of
the victim. However, recent research highlights the role that attention plays in the generation of feelings. We expanded
on this idea by investigating whether sympathy depends on cognitive mechanisms such as attention. In two studies we
found that sympathy responses were lower and reaction times were longer when targets were presented with distractors.
In addition, online sympathy judgments that allow attentional focusing on a target lead to greater affective responses
than judgments made from memory. We conclude that attention is an ingredient in the generation of sympathy, and
discuss implications for research on prosocial behaviour and the interaction between attention and emotions.
Keywords: emotions, attention, pro-social behavior.
1 Introduction
Witnessing the suffering of others often invokes emo-
tional reactions in the observers. The link between em-
pathic responses and willingness to provide help to oth-
ers has been the subject of recent research on emotional
responses and prosocial behaviour. Feelings such as em-
pathy, sympathy, compassion, distress, pity, and even an-
ticipated regret are typically involved in decisions to pro-
vide assistance or donate money to those in need (Batson,
1990; Batson, Eklund, Chermok, Hoyt, & Ortiz, 2007;
Dickert, 2008; Kogut & Ritov, 2005a, 2005b; Loewen-
stein & Small, 2007; Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic,
2007).
Given the prominent role of emotions in prosocial be-
haviour, research has begun to tackle the important ques-
tion of what drives the generation of feelings relevant for
helping others. Slovic (2007) suggests a model by which
mental images and attention are two vital precursors for
emotional reactions towards others in distress. Mental
images can contain affective tags that serve as a signal
for the selection of behavioural alternatives (Damasio,
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1994; Peters & Slovic, 2000; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, &
MacGregor, 2002). A direct consequence of this mecha-
nism is that people are more likely to generate sympa-
thetic responses when they are able to mentally imag-
ine the victim. In fact, research on perspective taking
(e.g., Batson et al., 2007; Davis, 1994) supports this no-
tion and shows that more empathic concern is generated
for victims that are similar to the perceiver (Loewenstein
& Small, 2007). Additionally, we seem to “feel” more
for individual victims than for groups of victims because
mental images of single, identified victims are more vivid
and concrete (Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997; Kogut & Ri-
tov, 2005a; Slovic, 2007; Västfjäll, Peters, & Slovic, in
preparation).
The predisposition to perceive groups of people as less
unitary is closely connected to Gestalt theories of percep-
tion (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996), an association which
highlights that perceptual processes are closely related
to other, more complex impression formation processes
(Glöckner & Betsch, 2008; Kahneman, 2003). The con-
nection between Gestalt principles of perception and im-
pression formation is of particular interest, as perceptual
processes impose limitations on our ability to process
large numbers of people in the same way that psycholog-
ical processes may restrict our ability to feel compassion
for large numbers of victims. Additionally, it shows that
perceptual and attentional processes can influence affec-
tive reactions, as posited by Slovic (2007).
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1.1 The interaction between emotions and
attention
Research on the interplay between emotions and attention
has often highlighted the selective effects of emotions
on people’s attentional focus (e.g., Fox, 2002). Highly
relevant affective stimuli are processed faster and hold
attention longer than affectively neutral stimuli (East-
wood, Smilek, & Merikle, 2001). The apparent effects of
emotional stimuli (such as threatening or fearful stimuli)
on behavioural responses (e.g., orienting reaction times)
prompted researchers to suggest neural networks that al-
low for attentional and emotional modulation of visual
processes (Vuilleumier & Driver, 2007). Top-down mod-
ulation of emotionally significant stimuli on attentional
tasks indicates that neural networks exist that allow for
rapid communication between attentional and emotional
neural systems (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000). Whereas
emotions can direct attention to affectively salient objects
(Ochsner & Phelps, 2007; Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver,
& Dolan, 2003; Vuilleumier, 2005), attention can influ-
ence emotional reactions by inhibiting as well as enhanc-
ing and generating emotional reactions to stimuli (Fenske
& Raymond, 2006). The ability to shift attention helps
in regulating one’s own negative emotional state (Gross,
2002; Posner & Rothbart, 2007; Rueda, Posner, & Roth-
bart, 2005), while focal (spatial) attention facilitates sub-
sequent and more elaborate emotional processing and can
have a profound effect on the generation of emotions
(Holmes, Vuilleumier, & Eimer, 2003).
The effects of attention on the generation of emo-
tions were demonstrated in a series of insightful ex-
periments that highlight the emotional inhibitory conse-
quences of attending to specific locations in one’s visual
field (Fenske et al., 2005; Fenske, Raymond, & Kunar,
2004; Raymond, Fenske, & Tavassoli, 2003). These au-
thors consistently show that not attending to distractor
stimuli devalues these on affective as well as other di-
mensions, a phenomenon that they term the attentional
inhibition hypothesis (Fenske & Raymond, 2006). For
example, smiling and neutral distractor faces were seen
as less trustworthy than attended target faces, and abstract
Mondrian stimuli were evaluated as less cheerful when
unattended.
In this article, we expand on the attentional inhibition
hypothesis by examining the facilitating effects that at-
tention has on the generation of sympathy. Groups and
individuals are processed differently on cognitive (Ariely,
2001; Hamilton & Sherman, 1996) and emotional dimen-
sions; affective reactions towards single identified vic-
tims are often more intense compared to groups of vic-
tims (Slovic, 2007). A peculiar and inherent property of
a group of individuals is that attention to any single in-
dividual can be decreased by the presence of the other
victims. If attentional focus is indeed facilitating the gen-
eration of empathic emotions for individual victims, then
other members of a group can assume a distracting role
for single individual members. Sympathy for individual
victims would then be dependent on the constraints that
the distraction places on the ability to attend to each indi-
vidual.
In two experiments, we used a paradigm that placed
participants in a position to react empathically to victims
in need of help and manipulated their ability to visually
attend to a single target victim. It was expected that dis-
tracting attention away from individual targets decreases
emotional responses. We hypothesized that visual dis-
tractors, in the form of other victims, negatively influence
the attention needed to generate sympathy towards a tar-
get victim, and that sympathy judgments are higher for
a single target victim presented alone vs. with distrac-
tor victims. Additionally, we were interested in whether
these emotional reactions are different when targets were
evaluated online (i.e., while visually focusing on a pic-
ture of the target) vs. when these evaluations were made
from memory. Hastie and Park (1986) propose that judg-
ments from memory are more effortful than spontaneous
online judgments, and that attending to a target is easer
when judged online vs. from memory. Affective reac-
tions are thought to be stronger when mental representa-
tions are attended to and more vivid (Pham, 2007; Slovic
et al., 2002). Judgments based on memory retrieval, on
the other hand, can lead to less vivid impression forma-




Participants. Fifty-eight participants (79% female) with
an average age of M = 21.9 (SD = 4.5) at the University
of Oregon completed Experiment 1. All participants had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Design and materials. Online vs. memory judgments
and presence vs. absence of distractors were manipulated
in a fully factorial 2x2 within-subjects design. Partici-
pants rated their sympathy for victims identified by a spa-
tial cue that appeared either before or after a target pic-
ture. Online judgments were realized by a spatial cue
presented before the target picture, while memory judg-
ments featured a cue that appeared after the presentation
of the target picture. Thus, in the online judgment condi-
tion, participants were able to focus on the specific loca-
tion where the target picture would appear and make an
online sympathy judgment while attending to the picture.
In the memory condition, the spatial cue appeared after
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Figure 1: Design schematic (online judgment pair).
the presentation of the target picture, and sympathy judg-
ments were based on a memory representation. Target
pictures were either flanked by seven distractor victims
or presented alone. The primary dependent variable was
sympathy ratings for the target picture. Reaction times
for these sympathy ratings were also recorded.
The target and distractor pictures were part of the same
set of eight pictures (four female children and four male
children, taken from Kogut & Ritov, 2005a,b). Partici-
pants saw each picture an equal number of times in the
four conditions. In each condition the eight possible pic-
tures served as the target victim twice, resulting in 64 ex-
perimental trials.
Apparatus and procedure. Participants were seated
65cm in front of a 17” computer screen (resolution =
1024 x 768) and were informed that they would see pic-
tures of children in need of a financial contribution due to
a life-threatening disease. Participants were further told
that the child that elicited the highest average sympathy
would receive a donation from the experimenters on be-
half of the participants. Each trial started with a fixation
cross presented for 150ms at the center of the screen, as
shown in Figure 1. In the online judgment conditions,
a red dot cue (size = .5°) appeared at one of eight pos-
sible locations (on a horizontal line) at the exact spatial
location where the target picture (size = 4.5°) would ap-
pear later. Dot cues were shown for 500ms, pictures for
3000ms, and between dots and pictures a 150ms blank
screen was interleaved. After seeing the target picture,
participants rated how much sympathy they felt on a ver-
tical sliding scale (300 pixels = 8.7° anchored by 0=“No
sympathy at all” to 300=“Very much sympathy”) with a
vertically movable cursor corresponding to movements of
the mouse. The memory judgment condition was identi-
cal to the online judgment condition, except that pictures
were presented before the cues, such that participants first
saw one (or eight) pictures, but could identify the target
only after the pictures disappeared and the spatial cue
was presented. The order of pictures presented was de-
termined with a Latin-square to ensure that any effect of
picture order on sympathy would be counterbalanced.
2.2 Results
Sympathy judgment. Sympathy ratings were averaged
across pictures for each condition. The results, depicted
in Figure 2, suggest that, regardless of whether judgments
were made online or from memory, target victims re-
ceived higher sympathy ratings when they were presented
without distractor victims. Sympathy ratings were lowest
when the target victim was presented with distractors and
judgments were made from memory.
A repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA)
with judgment mode and presence of distractors as
within-subject factors revealed a significant main effect
for judgment mode, such that sympathy ratings were sig-
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Figure 2: Mean sympathy ratings for Experiment 1.
nificantly higher when made online (M=179.6, SD=70.8)
vs. from memory (M=173.7; SD=72.5), F(1,57)=4.8, p
< .05, ηp2=.08. Participants also gave higher sympa-
thy ratings when target pictures were presented with-
out distractors (M=183.4, SD=70.1) vs. with distractors,
(M=169.5; SD=73.2), F(1,57)=10.7, p < .01, ηp2=.16.
Furthermore, a significant interaction between judgment
mode and presence of distractors emerged from the data,
F(1,57)=10.8, p < .01, ηp2=.16. To further elucidate this
interaction, simple contrasts were conducted and revealed
that, for memory judgments, targets without distractors
(M = 184.4; SD = 70.1) received significantly higher sym-
pathy ratings compared to targets with distractors (M =
163.1; SD = 75.0), t(57)=3.8, p < .01, Cohen’s d=0.51.
This difference was still marginally significant for on-
line judgments, with participants expressing higher sym-
pathy for targets without distractors (M = 183.3; SD =
70.2) vs. with distractors present (M = 175.8; SD = 71.2),
t(57)=1.8, p < .08, Cohen’s d = 0.24.
It is possible that the observed decrease of sympa-
thy judgments in the memory condition with distrac-
tors was due to participants not being able to remember
which target picture they were rating and making an av-
erage judgment instead. If this was indeed the case, we
would expect lower variance in sympathy responses es-
pecially in the memory judgment condition when distrac-
tors were presented. However, we found no evidence for
decreased variance in this condition relative to the other
conditions. In fact, F-tests revealed that variances were
similar in all four conditions, Fs<1.1, ps>.31. To fur-
ther exclude the possibility that participants were mak-
ing average judgments in the memory condition, we also
examined whether significant differences in sympathy
judgments existed for the individual pictures. If partic-




































Figure 3: Mean reaction times for Experiment 1.
ipants did not recall which picture to judge, we would ex-
pect that their responses differ systematically compared
to the online condition. A 2 judgment condition (on-
line vs. memory) x 8 picture, repeated-measures ANOVA
with sympathy ratings as the dependent variable revealed
that some pictures evoked more sympathy than others,
F(7,399) = 56.4, p < .001, η2=.50. However these ratings
did not interact with the judgment condition, F(7,399) =
1.7, p = .10, η2=.03, showing no evidence that the differ-
ences in ratings of the individual pictures were dependent
on the judgment condition.
Reaction time analysis. A similar 2x2 repeated-
measures ANOVA was conducted on participants’ av-
erage reaction times for each condition. Results show
that memory judgments took longer than online judg-
ments, F(1,57)=9.8, p < .01, ηp2=.15, and participants’
reaction time was slower when distractors were present,
F(1,57)=23.4, p < .001, ηp2=.29. Additionally the in-
teraction between these two factors was also significant,
F(1,57)=15.7, p < .001, ηp2=.22. As can be seen in Fig-
ure 3, reaction times were longer for memory judgments
when distractors were present. In this condition, partici-
pants had to first recall which of the previously seen pic-
tures corresponded to the cue before indicating their sym-
pathy rating. Given that the reaction times are similar in
the other conditions, it is possible that the difficulty and
compound effects of memory retrieval and distractors are
responsible for the longer reaction times.
We further investigated whether participants’ sym-
pathy judgments correlated with reaction times. Al-
though faster reactions times were generally accompa-
nied by higher sympathy ratings in each of the four con-
ditions (rs ranged from −.24 to −.01), the correlation
approached conventional significance levels only in the
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online judgment/no-distractor condition, r(57) = −.24,
p<.08. However, across all observations, the correlation
between sympathy ratings and reaction times was statis-
tically significant, r(230) = −.13, p = .037.
2.3 Discussion
Experiment 1 was designed to investigate the role of
attention in the generation of sympathy. Results sup-
ported the hypothesis that a single target victim evokes
more sympathy when presented alone vs. flanked by dis-
tractor victims, which is in line with findings that emo-
tional responses decrease as the number of victims in-
crease (Slovic, 2007). This effect was present when judg-
ments were made online as well as from memory, how-
ever it was especially pronounced when affective judg-
ments were made based on memory. It seems likely that
online processing enabled more vivid images and, in turn,
stronger empathic responses than memory processing, an
explanation that dovetails nicely with research on person
perception (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996) and affect (e.g.,
Slovic, et al., 2002; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch,
2001).
A possible alternative explanation of the results in Ex-
periment 1 is that participants gave lower sympathy rat-
ings in the memory judgment/distractor condition simply
because they were unable to clearly identify which target
they were supposed to rate. However, similar results (al-
beit less pronounced) were obtained for the online judg-
ment condition, which cannot be explained by an account
that focuses solely on unsuccessful retrieval of the target
picture. Moreover, if participants were unable to identify
the individual pictures in the memory judgment/distractor
condition and instead gave average ratings, we would ex-
pect little difference in how the individual pictures were
rated in this condition. This was not the case, and dif-
ferences in sympathy ratings for individual pictures did
not depend on the judgment condition. Nonetheless, we
addressed this concern directly in Experiment 2 to clar-
ify the role that correct identification plays in empathic
responses.
3 Experiment 2
Experiment 2 sought to replicate the general findings in
Experiment 1 and rule out the possibility that lower sym-
pathy ratings were mainly a product of unsuccessful re-
trieval of the target picture. The number of distractors
was reduced and the viewing time for the pictures was ex-
tended to facilitate better encoding. We also added a ma-
nipulation check to verify that participants could indeed
identify the target retrospectively. Moreover, we were in
a position to replicate the basic findings in a different set-
ting to test whether the effects of attention on the genera-
tion of empathic feelings generalize to a different culture.
3.1 Method
Participants. Forty-eight participants (53% female) from
the University of Bonn, Germany, and community mem-
bers with an average age of 25.7 (SD = 7.4) took part in
this study and were paid an average of 12C as compen-
sation for their time in a test battery that included other
experiments unrelated to this study.
Design and materials. The design and materials were
similar to those used in Experiment 1. Participants saw a
total of 64 experimental trials, in which they rated their
sympathy for one of eight possible children suffering
from an unspecified disease. The two variables of interest
(judgment mode and presence of distractors) were manip-
ulated in the same fashion as in Experiment 1. However,
unlike Experiment 1, here we reduced the number of dis-
tractor pictures to three and used a block-design where
trials were blocked by judgment mode. Half of the par-
ticipants made online judgments for the first 32 trials and
memory judgments for the second 32 trials, and this or-
der was reversed for the other half. Within each block,
target pictures were presented randomly with and with-
out distractors. The target and distractor pictures could
appear in four locations: above, below, right, or left at an
equal distance from a central fixation cross. As in Experi-
ment 1, the distractor variable was crossed with judgment
mode. On half of the trials a spatial cue appeared before
the picture(s), and followed the pictures on the other half
of the trials. The spatial cue was presented for 500ms and
the pictures for 4000ms. At the end of each trial, partic-
ipants rated their respective sympathy level of the target
picture with a sliding scale (500 pixels = 13.8°, anchored
by 0=“No sympathy at all” to 500=“Very much sympa-
thy”).
After completion of the 64 experimental trials, 24 ma-
nipulation check trials were added in which participants
had to correctly identify a target picture. The correct
identification of the target picture was a concern only for
trials in the memory condition with distractors. Thus, the
manipulation check trials had a similar structure as the
memory judgment condition: In each of these trials, four
pictures were presented after the fixation cross, followed
by a cue. Participants were then asked to judge whether
a test picture corresponded to the target picture identified
by the cue. Three types of manipulation check trials were
used, each presented a total of eight times: The test pic-
ture was (1) identical to the target picture, (2) not iden-
tical to the target picture but part of the picture set used
in the study, and (3) not identical to the target picture and
belonged to a completely different set of pictures not used
in the 64 experimental trials.
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3.2 Results
Manipulation check. Overall, every participant answered
more than 87% of the manipulation check trials correctly,
and none performed below 75% in any of the three ma-
nipulation check trial types. We took this as evidence
that participants were quite able to correctly identify the
target picture and base their sympathy judgment on the
correct mental representation when target pictures were
presented with distractors in the memory condition.
Sympathy judgments. A preliminary analysis con-
firmed that no significant difference existed between the
orders in which the blocked online and memory judg-
ments were made, which justified simplifying further
analyses to a 2 (online vs. memory judgment) x 2 (dis-
tractors vs. no distractors) within-subjects design. An
ANOVA with judgment mode and presence of distractors
revealed a significant main effect for distractors, F(1,47)
= 4.19, p < .05, ηp2 = .08. Participants gave higher sym-
pathy judgments when pictures were presented without
distractors (M = 230.5, SD = 69.4) than when distractors
were present (M = 218.8, SD = 90.6). The main effect
for judgment mode was not significant, F(1,47) = 1.01,
p = .32, ηp2 = .02, however the mean difference was in
the predicted direction such that participants gave higher
sympathy judgments when making their judgment online
(M = 227.3, SD = 86.6) vs. from memory (M = 222.0, SD
= 73.8). Finally, although the interaction between judg-
ment mode and presence of distractors was not signifi-
cant, F(1,47) < 1, p = .72, ηp2 = .01, simple contrasts
revealed that participants gave significantly higher sym-
pathy judgments without distractors (M = 228.5, SD =
71.0) vs. with distractors (M = 215.5, SD = 76.5) only
in the memory judgment condition, t(47) = 4.06, p <.001,
Cohen’s d = 0.59. This effect was also present but not sig-
nificant when participants made online judgments (M =
222.1, SD = 105.3 and M = 232.4, SD = 67.8 for with and
without distractors, respectively), t(47) = 1.13, p =.26,
Cohen’s d = 0.16. See Figure 4 for details.
As in Experiment 1, we tested whether the decrease in
sympathy judgments in the memory condition with dis-
tractors was based on participants’ not being able to iden-
tify the target picture retrospectively and instead making
an average judgment. A 2 judgment condition (online
vs. memory) x 8 picture repeated-measures ANOVA indi-
cated that although sympathy ratings differed for the pic-
tures, F(7,329) = 13.5, p < .001, η2=.22, this did not de-
pend on whether pictures were seen in the memory or on-
line judgment condition as indicated by a non-significant
interaction, F(7,329) = 0.4, p = .87, η2=.01.
Reaction time results. A similar 2 x 2 factorial
ANOVA for reaction times showed a significant main
effect for judgment mode, F(1,47)=26.52, p < .001,
ηp
2=.36, and presence of distractors, F(1,47) = 10.75,




























Figure 4: Mean sympathy ratings for Experiment 2.
p= .01, ηp2=.19. As expected, sympathy judgments were
faster when made online than when made from memory.
Additionally, sympathy judgments were faster when tar-
gets were presented without distractors. Apart from the
main effects, the interaction between judgment mode and
distractors was also significant, F(1,47) = 11.37, p= .01,
ηp
2=.20. Figure 5 illustrates that judgments were gener-
ally slower when distractors were present, but that this ef-
fect was particularly present when judgments were made
online, t(47)=5.5, p <.001, Cohen’s d = 0.79. In the mem-
ory condition, the effect of distractors on participants’ re-
action times was minimal, t(47)=.1, p =.93, Cohen’s d =
0.01. Unlike in Experiment 1, we did not find that reac-
tion times correlated with sympathy ratings, (rs ranged
from .14 to -.02), ps >.35.
3.3 Discussion
Experiment 2 was designed to replicate and extend the
finding that presenting distractors reduces emotional re-
sponses to individual targets while controlling whether
participants could successfully recall the target picture in
the memory condition. As predicted, participants gave
lower sympathy ratings towards individual victims when
distractor victims were presented simultaneously. Ad-
ditionally, in Experiment 2 sympathy judgments from
memory were lower than online judgments, as was ex-
pected, albeit not significantly so.1 It is of note that reduc-
1In order to increase power, we reanalyzed our sympathy data com-
bining both experiments. The results showed that participants gave
higher sympathy ratings when target pictures were shown without dis-
tractors (M = 205, SD = 73.1) compared to when they were presented
with distractors (M = 191.8, SD = 85.5), F(1,105) = 14.0, p < .001,
η2=.12. Sympathy ratings were also higher when participants made
their judgments online (M = 201.2, SD = 82.4) vs. from memory (M =
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Figure 5: Mean reaction times for Experiment 2.
ing the number of distractors from seven to three across
experiments did not eliminate the effect of distractors on
sympathy judgments. However, compared to Experiment
1, participants in Experiment 2 gave lower sympathy rat-
ings in general.
Reaction times in Experiment 2 were slightly differ-
ent compared to Experiment 1. Memory judgments took
longer than online judgments in both Experiments, but
the effect of distractors was most prominent in the mem-
ory condition in Experiment 1, whereas in Experiment
2 the effects of distractors was most visible in the on-
line condition. It would be expected that seven distrac-
tors are more attention diverting than three, resulting in
slower judgments in the memory condition in Experi-
ment 1 compared to Experiment 2. However, it is unclear
why participants were faster in the online judgment/no-
distractor condition compared to the distractor condition
in Experiment 2 and could be due to the change in dis-
tance between distractors and target. Additionally, it is
possible that having fewer distractors leads to a slower,
more comparative process underlying the sympathy judg-
ment of the target. Hyde and Spelke (2009) show that
a fundamental difference exists in how small and large
numbers are processed, and that adults treat small num-
bers (i.e., 1–3) as separate objects that are individually
compared.
195.6, SD = 77.0), F(1,105) = 4.1, p < .05, η2=.04. The interaction be-
tween presence of distractors and judgment mode was also significant,
F(1,105) = 4.6, p < .001, η2=.04. Of note is that sympathy judgments
were higher for targets shown without distractors in both the online and
memory condition, t(105) = 1.86, p = .065 and t(105) = 5.2, p <.01,
respectively.
4 General discussion
Two experiments were conducted to test the hypothesis
that distractors and judgment mode influence the gener-
ation of emotions. Specifically, these studies were de-
signed to test whether attention is a precursor for em-
pathic feelings, as proposed by Slovic (2007). Across
both experiments, sympathy for others was lower when
distractor victims were present. Additionally, we found
evidence that sympathy judgments were higher when
made online vs. from memory. Both of these results in-
dicate that attention to a target can intensify an emotional
response. Reaction time results further show that judg-
ments from memory take longer, which is indicative of a
more difficult retrieval process compared to online judg-
ments. We found partial evidence that longer reaction
times coincide with lower sympathy ratings indicating
that sympathy judgments may be sensitive to the timing
of the emotional response. Greater temporal distance be-
tween encountering and emotionally reacting to a victim
might be related to and contribute to other determinants
of sympathy, such as vividness and newness (Loewen-
stein & Small, 2007). Our findings also suggest that em-
pathic concern for others and the often observed reduc-
tion in empathy for multiple victims is, at least partly,
a result of divided attention. This result contributes
to recent advances made in the exploration of how at-
tentional mechanisms influence social-emotional evalu-
ations, and extends research by Fenske and colleagues
(e.g., Fenske & Raymond, 2006), who examined the in-
hibitory effects of attention on judgments of trustworthi-
ness of faces (Fenske et al., 2005; Raymond, Fenske, &
Westoby, 2005) and cheerfulness (Fenske, Raymond, &
Kunar, 2004).
Our results are best viewed from the perspective that
the effects of attention are not unilateral, and can inhibit
as well as facilitate emotional reactions. Thus, we sug-
gest that sympathy is not generated to a similar degree
when target victims are flanked by distractor victims due
to attentional constraints of the perceptual system (e.g.,
Posner & Raichle, 1994). Furthermore, our results also
shed new light on the identified-victim and singularity
effects reported in research on prosocial behaviour (e.g.,
Kogut & Ritov, 2005a,b; Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic,
2007) by suggesting that a precursor to affective reactions
is attentional focus.
In our studies we used pictures of other victims as dis-
tractors to target victims. It is possible that the observed
attention effects on sympathy ratings are not limited to
the use of other victims as distractors and could be visi-
ble with other classes of stimuli. However, evidence ex-
ists that human faces tend to be processed differently and
are more attention grabbing than other, non-face stim-
uli (Downing, Chan, Peelen, Dodds, & Kanwisher, 2006;
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 4, No. 4, June 2009 Attentional mechanisms in the generation of sympathy 304
Lavie, Ro, & Russell, 2003; Ro, Russell, & Lavie, 2001;
Theeuwes & Van der Stigchel, 2006). In fact, Ro et al.
demonstrate that faces are preferentially attended to in
comparison to other common objects, and Theeuwes and
Van der Stigchel argue that the discrimination of human
faces from other objects is based on pre-attentive and un-
conscious processing, which automatically draws focal
attention to the faces.
4.1 Alternative accounts and limitations
Alternative accounts for how perceptual experience
translates into affective evaluations (such as the mere-
exposure effect and perceptual fluency) could potentially
explain our results. However, the fact that participants
saw each victim an equal amount of times makes explana-
tions based on theories that capitalize on the mere expo-
sure effect less likely (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Zajonc,
1968). The result that individual victims received higher
sympathy ratings when presented alone seems to be better
explained by the influence that distractors have on partic-
ipants’ attention to the individual target when other vic-
tims were present. Research on perceptual fluency (e.g.,
Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003) posits
that easier cognitive processing elicits differential emo-
tional reactions. Recall that sympathy judgments were
lowest in the distractor/memory condition, which is also
cognitively most demanding. However, the effect of dis-
tractors was also present in the cognitively less demand-
ing online judgment condition. Furthermore, the percep-
tual fluency account suggests that ease of processing re-
sults in distinctly positive affect. However, empathic con-
cern is usually classified as an arousal state with distinctly
negative valence that motivates prosocial behaviour in or-
der to reduce this negative feeling (Batson, 1990).
A possible limitation in our design was that we did not
collect sympathy judgments for distractors, which would
have allowed us to directly compare whether attended tar-
gets receive more sympathy than unattended distractors.
Additionally, because we were interested in the connec-
tion between perceptual systems and emotions we specif-
ically investigated the role of focal visual attention, which
does not allow definite conclusions for other forms of at-
tention (Posner & Rothbart, 2007).
4.2 Implications and future research
Our results point to exciting relationships between atten-
tional and affective systems, which are of importance in
understanding the generation of feelings and its conse-
quences for behavior. Presenting a group of people in
need of help can increase the difficulty of attending to
any single individual, leading to lower sympathy. Conse-
quently, in order to elicit more empathic concern and pos-
sibly a higher willingness to help others, it might be bet-
ter to use presentation formats that take advantage of at-
tentional processes (e.g., single presentation). While we
have used a research task specific to prosocial behavior,
the attentional mechanisms discussed in the current pa-
per are important for other tasks that capitalize on the re-
lationship between emotions and decision making (such
as the endowment effect). Future research should address
the extent to which attention is a precursor to affective
reactions related to the construction of preferences and
valuations.
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